Conflict and Chaos: Unpacking the Thai-Cambodia Border Dispute
- Discuss Diglett
- Dec 31, 2025
- 9 min read
This article is co-authored by Luo Xuhong and Nicole Lee. Cover image by Nicole Lee
*This article is published in collaboration with Doomscroll Diplomacy, your next one-stop platform for all things foreign affairs. Check out Doomscroll Diplomacy's telegram channel here.
As ASEAN marks its 60th anniversary, the regional bloc has often prided itself for managing to achieve regional peace and stability as a mission well done. After all, no full-scale armed conflict has erupted between member states since its 1967 founding.
Well, this claim may no longer hold true. The recent spate of clashes along the rugged, poorly demarcated 800km land border between Thailand and Cambodia has escalated to the surprise of many observers. With an unprecedented escalation of hostilities in July alone (some 40 casualties with over 250,000 displaced in a matter of days), ASEAN’s organisational shortcomings have been revealed in painful detail once more.
A sojourn back in time: the ongoing border conflict traces its origins to the early 1900s, when a series of unclear colonial-era maps left significant swathes of border regions in the Preah Vihear province under dispute. While an earlier 1904 Treaty depicted the temple complex as squarely within Thai territory, a subsequent map published 4 years later gave the exact opposite conclusion, delineating it as part of French Indochina instead.
The frontier was largely quiet over the next few decades until Cambodia’s 1953 independence. Amidst the French withdrawal, Thai forces occupied the contested area that encompassed the Preah Vihear temple complex and its surroundings.
After years of tenuous negotiations that failed to produce a satisfactory outcome for both parties, an increasingly exasperated Cambodia would eventually refer the matter to the International Court of Justice (remember that ASEAN did not come into existence until 1967 and in either case, Cambodia would not be admitted as a full member until 1999).
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
Despite Bangkok’s insistence that it had never officially accepted nor recognised the 1908 Annex I map, the ICJ largely ruled in Cambodia’s favour. The court found that Thailand had de facto acknowledged Phnom Penh’s sovereignty over Preah Vihear given the former’s lack of protest over Cambodia’s occupation in the preceding decades. Yet, the ruling left the question of sovereignty concerning the 4.6 square km of land surrounding Preah Vihear unanswered, a matter that would haunt the nations in the subsequent decades.
“Even if there were any doubt as to Siam’s acceptance of the map in 1908, and hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the Court would consider, in the light of the subsequent course of events, that Thailand is now precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept it”
While Thailand did withdraw its forces from the temple complex in compliance with the ICJ ruling, it also swiftly (and unilaterally) erected barbed wire that separated the temple from its surroundings just months later in July. Crucially, the ICJ ruling also affirmed Thailand’s subsequent position favouring bilateral negotiations over international arbitration, knowing that latter outcomes would be similarly unhelpful to her case (see 2013 ICJ interpretation as discussed below).
As Cold War tensions swept across Southeast Asia in the following decades, the border dispute quietly faded into the background, a ticking time bomb that was waiting to blow up.
On occasion, pragmatism did prevail. Various mechanisms for conflict management and de-escalation were established, specifically the General Border Committee and Regional Border Committee in 1995, followed by the Joint Boundary Commission in 1997.
Economic priorities also cooled tensions over time. Thailand under Thaksin Shinawatra inked a 2001 Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation with Cambodia and spearheaded a boundary development zone that included Preah Vihear province. Later on, Thaksin also expressed support for Cambodia's UNESCO World Heritage listing bid for Preah Vihear in 2005.
However, economic developments masked underlying political tensions arising from the perennial issue of territorial incompatibility all too well.
Reopening an old wound
Armed clashes erupted in 2008 over Thailand's support of Cambodia's UNESCO application and later escalated. Back then, the flames of conflict were fanned by nationalist sentiments in both nations in an uncanny resemblance to the events of today. While we will not examine the details of the 2008 clashes in this article, we do wish to highlight the key role that nationalism played on both sides of the border.
Capitalising on border tensions allowed strongman Hun Sen to score a decisive victory in the July 2008 elections and consolidate military support. Apart from offering a convenient distraction from a laggard economy barely recovering from the financial crisis, analysts have also pointed to Hun Sen’s motives of burnishing the credentials of his son and successor-in-line, Hun Manet.
Across the border, Thailand’s own fractured political landscape proved to be equally combustible. After Thaksin’s ousting, successor Abhisit Vejjajiva adopted a hardline stance that worsened tensions. Emboldened by the wave of nationalism that swept through Thailand, radicals within the People's Alliance for Democracy (also known as “Yellow Shirts”) soon started criticising Abhisit’s own position for alleged “softness” towards Cambodia, even to the point of calling for Thai military intervention in border areas.
Ball in Hun Sen's Court
As the conflict raged on with no end in sight, Cambodia appealed to the UNSC in 2008 and again in 2011 for assistance, and most ironically, was referred back to ASEAN on both instances. By then, both nations had all but abandoned ASEAN’s core principle of self-restraint as pockets of intense clashes emerged.
In an unfortunate coincidence, ASEAN’s then Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan was also a member of a Thai political party opposed to Thaksin (and by extension, anti-Cambodia). Unsurprisingly, Hun Sen had no confidence in the bloc’s ability to manage the crisis at all.
The ICJ’s 2013 clarification was arguably just as unhelpful (albeit face-saving for both countries): while it affirmed the earlier 1962 ruling and ordered the establishment of a demilitarised zone around the temple complex, it also ruled that the promontory of Preah Vihear belonged to Cambodia (and not the entire 4.6 square km). Crucially, it left the question of sovereignty over the surrounding 4.6km^2 unanswered once more and ordered both nations to commence good faith negotiations under ASEAN auspices.
In the clearest sign yet that Hun Sen controlled the levers of the (political) dispute, clashes subsided in time for the May 2011 ASEAN summit. Bilateral relations were promptly restored upon the return of the Thaksin faction with sister Yingluck’s election victory.
The Solemn Outcome—A Breakdown of the Dispute’s Effects
Following the above analysis on the Thai-Cambodia border dispute, we’ll now examine its impact on both parties. With every cause comes an effect–in this case, the dispute has resulted in substantial damage to both nations, spanning across various aspects. As for this evaluation, we’ll be looking at both socio-political and economical factors.
Thai-Cambodian relations have warmed over several occasions, some due to their shared economic interests. However, the dispute has brought nothing but setbacks to their economies.
The shared border acts as a trading route (also known as the South Economic Corridor) for both countries; following its disruption, economic activities and centres in Cambodia were cut off, resulting in reduced resource flow via trade, eventually impeding the Cambodian economy. Not to mention, the dispute extends beyond the border as Cambodia is at risk of being cut off by Thailand.
Thailand, as of date, remains one of the largest contributors to Cambodia through FDIs, migrant intake and even tourism. With the ongoing conflicts, such cooperation is expected to dip. All these factors would prompt government expenditure on countermeasures including cash outs, training, services etc, further draining the nation of its reserves as the economy continues to wane.
Thailand also had her fair share of economic damage–on 29 July, Finance Minister Mr Pichai Chunhavajira had estimated the total damage to be more than S$397 million, owing to damaged property and evacuation efforts, not including trade disruptions. The Thai government was to churn out a budget of S$25 million for further efforts.
While the situation remains not much of a threat to Thailand's overall GDP, it does disrupt certain pillars of its economy, say border trade and international tourism. The stagnation in trade flow along the border, coupled with the international caution towards Thai tourism has landed a distinct blow on the nation’s potential revenue.
And that’s just one aspect. Let’s take a look at yet another crucial factor, socio-political effects.
As social unrest bubbles beneath layers of the public, nationalism is on the rise once more. With the gradual shift of the general mindset, political dynamics are due to change, be it Thai or Cambodian. Within the period of the border dispute, Cambodia’s high-level politicians seized the opportunity to rally domestic support for their cause, taking to marches or online platforms to reiterate their pro-Cambodian sentiments while reprehending Thailand. No doubt, the current top leaders of Cambodia have consolidated sufficient power following the pouring in of nationalist support, further solidifying their positions in the ranks.
In contrast, the Thai government has been met with setbacks as civilian tension grows. On 15 June 2025, a phone call between then Thai PM Paetongtharn Shinawatra and former Cambodian PM Hun Sen was leaked, sparking a heated response which aggravated tensions between the nations. In the phone call, Ms Shinawatra had allegedly criticised the Thai military, compromising with the Cambodian side to settle for peace.
The leak was a pivotal moment in Thai politics as public distrust towards the government sprouted shortly after; The Shinawatra family had a turbulent history with the Thai military, and the call only fanned the flames of the situation. Ms Shinawatra was subsequently suspended and ousted from parliament as part of the Thai Court’s orders, leaving behind a politically unstable landscape.
Once again, the empty position for Prime Minister only fueled factionalist intentions as major parties like Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai and People’s Party vie for the spot. The upheaval has only reinforced factionalism within Thailand, as the coalition within the government body further compromises.
A Conclusion to The Issue: What could be done moving forward?
The matter at hand is rather complex; despite current measures put into place to contain the conflict, there remains further concerns to be addressed. Right now, it is only natural that both nations look toward de-escalating the situation, before its impending effects close in completely. To do so, they would have to look at the following principles of prevention, mitigation and recovery.
Firstly, prevention. Banking on their shared interests, Thailand and Cambodia may choose to implement joint border management policies, allowing a more nuanced approach to the sharing of the border. Such policies could include joint trading routes and custom checkpoints, allowing for not just a more harmonised border management system, but also a better flow of trade resources.
Furthermore, they may also decide to follow China's preventive diplomacy tactics–as a link between both nations, China plans to mediate for a ceasefire, so as to preserve economic investments while stabilising the already unsettled Southeast Asian region. This contrasts the US’s rigid approach of imposing tariffs in hopes of pushing for the conflict to be resolved, as the affected countries are in better positions to consider their own interests.
Next, mitigation. As aforementioned, the RBC was established in 1995 to diffuse any border related tensions. Both countries may focus on strengthening the already existing body to mitigate the conflict through enforcing efficient crisis response, which could be done through revisions of response protocols. By setting into stone standard protocols in times of crisis, the RBC may ensure higher efficiency and lower margins for error.
Finally, recovery. Governments may consider putting into place communication channels for civilians in affected areas as well as recovering their economies via regional investments. Digital platforms or local authority branches can serve as a link between the government and the people, disseminating crucial information to quell any forms of societal unrest. More importantly, regional investments through international bodies such as ASEAN’s AEC (ASEAN Economic Community) would serve to revitalise both economies, providing for recovery efforts as well as contributing to sustainable growth.
As of now, there’s no definite answer to how long this conflict will last, with the Thai-Cambodia border dispute standing as a byproduct of sensitive geopolitics. The key to ensuring long term peace lies within establishing solid trust through levels of cooperation between the countries, while tackling their respective internal issues. Only by doing so can they hope to resolve the conflict at hand, as well as preventing similar occurrences in the near future.
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