If The Citizens of a Democracy Are Not Well-Informed, Is That Democracy Imperilled?

Cover image by Stacey Ngiam

Democracy is talking itself to death. People don't know what they want or what's best for them. There is too much foolishness, too much lost motion. ~Bennito Mussolini

Image credit: Protect Democracy United

Despite living in an era of unprecedented information access, a striking paradox has emerged: citizens in liberal societies are increasingly uninformed and apathetic, particularly regarding politics. Indeed, in the UK, 70% of young people don’t know the name of their local MP, and roughly 39% of young people say they do not understand what politicians even do (Save the Children). Here in my home country of Singapore, when respondents were asked about whether they leaned left or right in their general political orientations, 13.3% said that they did not know, and therefore did not give an answer (Teo).

Many have cited the uninformed nature of the electorate as perhaps the most devastating challenge against the system. After all, democracies operate by representing the beliefs of the electorate. Thus, an uninformed mass of people, as fascist dictator Benito Mussolini argues, act foolishly, simply because they lack the capacity to comprehend what they should do.

I contend that this belief is inaccurate. We indeed have consistently underestimated our institutions and electorate’s flexibility in the absence of information. I will illustrate this in three separate parts. Part one of my essay will review the genealogy and literature behind the idea of an informed electorate, and why some have seen knowledge as essential to democracy. Part two will focus on what adaptations our democratic systems have evolved to accommodate what we know about the public. Finally, part three explores how the public, ostensibly ignorant, have still evolved to make nonetheless reasoned choices.

The “Informed Public” and the Democratic Dilemma

If information and an informed citizenry are critical pillars of democracy, then precisely what level of political knowledge qualifies as 'informed' becomes our first natural inquiry. As Walter Lippman observed in (The Phantom Public 13–14), the standard for being informed is high – democracy seems to demand such extensive knowledge such that man “must have the appetite of an encyclopaedist and infinite time ahead of him” to truly deliberate upon public policy. For Lippman, this standard is unattainable even for him, a veteran political journalist. He writes:

Though public business is my main interest and I give most of my time to watching it, I cannot find time to do what is expected of me in the theory of democracy; that is, to know what is going on and to have an opinion worth expressing on every question which confronts a self-governing community. ~Walter Lippman, The Phantom Public (10)

Later theorists have agreed. As Joseph Schumpeter claimed in his work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (262), while the public is capable of rationality in a market, they do not operate at this same level of rationality in the political "market" of elections , with the lack of individual decisiveness and a resulting void of feedback mechanisms leading to a lack of political information. Others, like Anthony Downs, agree. Introducing the concept of "rational ignorance," he posited that for most citizens, the marginal costs of acquiring information about politics severely outweigh the marginal benefits this information would bring, making it economically rational for the population to stay uninformed (Downs 244–46, 266–71).

It is on this basis of ignorance that a long line of philosophers and thinkers have argued against a democracy. Plato famously argued against democracy on the grounds of popular ignorance with his “Ship of State” analogy in The Republic VI, one that was expounded by theologian Sebastian Brant in his allegorical work Narrenschiff. This analogous comparison shows that citizens, uninformed and uninterested in matters of the state, cannot possibly directly rule a state – to do so would be akin to “sailors quarreling with one another about the steering”, though none have ever "learned the art of navigation."

We can draw two reasoned conclusions from the above. The first is that an informed electorate is merely a fantastical ideal, a “misleading pursuit” for an unattainable ideal of “omnicompetent citizens”, as Lippman describes. Thus, as this ideal of such a citizen is “comically” beyond the capabilities of every citizen in a democracy (Elliott 3). Moreover, even if a large portion of the electorate could overcome this technical hurdle (that is the time, energy and access to information), they would naturally be constrained by the lack of economic incentives to make behavioral adjustments in learning. The next conclusion is that due to the absurdly difficult nature in acquiring political knowledge, a direct democratic rule by the public cannot sustain itself without better-informed agents making decisions for them. Thus, without intermediary institutions, no coherent, stable or informed policies can be made. An uninformed, rash public cannot possibly come together autonomously, rationally deliberating and deciding policies to undertake in a state.

This forms a troublesome dilemma. If a majority of the public cannot truly become politically informed, and rule by the people requires an informed public, the natural conclusion is that democratic rule cannot sustain itself, foundering "quickly and disastrously” on the “reefs of cognitive incompetence" (Sartori 120). Thus, we ought to ask if, and how, our democratic systems can survive despite this ostensibly difficult challenge towards governance.

Institutional Adaptations

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Democratic systems are not static, nor universal. They, instead, are in a state of perpetual reinvention (Newton 1), constantly adapting to changing political demands and rising standards of democratic conduct. These systems have undergone a vast evolution from direct voting on all public policy questions by all citizens, a staple of fifth-century Athenian democracy. Indeed, historical records indicate that this direct rule often faltered, with Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War being attributed to the uninformed nature of the Athenian citizens, the Demos themselves (Thucydides et al.).

Consequently, the widespread adoption of representative democracy has emerged as the key adaptation to this challenge of the uninformed citizenry. This system prefers itself over direct democracy because it recognizes that public policy should not be based on the impulsive, instinctive desires of the general public (Neblo, Esterling, et al. 25). It actively works to alleviate the tension between direct rule and representation by incorporating intermediaries like an elected parliament for delegation and expert judgment. For many theorists like Montesquieu, this evolution came from a perspective of necessity, where a productive, entirely inclusive deliberative debate over an issue across huge nations was simply impossible (Montesquieu 20).

Thus, rather than expecting each individual to possess the high standards of information, representative democracies entrust the business of public policy to a select group of elected officials. These representatives are "assigned... sufficient time, resources,” as well as “access to relevant information and expertise to enable them to engage in effective deliberation and decision on public policy" (Newton and Geissel 1), partially overcoming the technical hurdle in obtaining political competency. Moreover, unlike the mass public, these officials are granted incentives to acquire and apply accurate information, which enables them to engage in productive deliberation and boosts reelection prospects (Elliott 13). In this sense, Lippman’s ideal of an omnipotent citizen becomes much more achievable for these elected public servants.

However, as John Dewey points out, "holding official position does not work a miracle of transubstantiation” (Dewey 68). Even if politicians are granted more time, information and resources, whilst being provided with incentives to become politically competent, holding elected office does not miraculously absolve them of “stupidies and errors” that mass publics fall into. Thus, beyond the mere act of electing representatives, the very architecture of modern democratic institutions further adapts to such a challenge. Within democratic legislative bodies, smaller working groups in the form of committees or commissions are created to allow for issue specialization (Robert and Patnode), where a smaller group of representatives can dedicate even more time and resources to understanding complex issues, hearing expert testimony, and scrutinizing proposed legislation in detail. This internal division of labor within the representative body itself ensures that policy is not formulated on the basis of superficial gut feeling, but rather through a process that incorporates specialized knowledge and deliberation, far beyond what any individual voter could realistically achieve.

Nevertheless, these adaptations do not end here. Indeed, democratic systems have also evolved to incorporate institutions that mediate the complex relationship between the uninformed public and their leaders (Neblo, Esterling, et al. 39), formally channeling their interests into specific issues they should care about. These entities act as aggregators of diverse interests and policy positions, simplifying the electoral choice for voters who may not have the time or inclination to research every candidate and every issue independently. They present coherent, ideologically identifiable platforms, reducing the informational burden on the electorate, thus allowing citizens to make choices on their overarching beliefs – instead of being constrained by their lack of the clear, granular understanding policymaking entails. This allows them to partially overcome their information shortfalls. In addition, this means that voters do not need to relate every political issue towards his own experiences and ideas (Downs 244–46, 266–71), allowing them to speak up for broader causes and issues that do not directly enter their personal domains.

Overall, these adaptations culminate in creating a fundamental division of labour: citizens are primarily expected to be informed enough to choose their representatives wisely, whilst political bodies, (parties and politicians), owing to greater resources are expected to hold a greater level of political competence, one that allows them to deliberate, decide, and ultimately, govern.

With these representative adaptations, democracy shows its adaptability and seemingly is able to circumvent much of the barriers constraining the system in the uninformed nature of the electorate. However, this only explains part of the dilemma. After all, as Delli and Keeter (50) argue, if voters lack basic information about the policy choices made by political leaders, then, the argument goes, elections can neither be “a useful mechanism” for selecting their leaders or “a credible check on the behavior of those leaders”. Accordingly, our next step of inquiry naturally progresses to questioning whether if, and how, the mass publics have evolved to make (somewhat paradoxically), reasoned decisions from uninformed worldviews.

Reasoned Choices from Uninformed People

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Oddly enough, reasoned choices can be made from irrational people, particularly in the realm of politics. Often, these reasoned choices can find their logic from intangibles, like distinct civic and moral principles, as well as heuristic-motivated judgement. Whilst individually, they may lack accuracy, combined, they can often arrive at sensible decisions.

First, intangibles often form the public’s subconscious philosophical grounding for their beliefs and decisions in a democracy. These virtues permeate our psyche and form our understanding of who we should be in our society, thus ideologically supporting democratic rule. These virtues are not a static set of laws (William Galston), but are akin to a collective civic disposition which fosters a functional tical environment – which Alexis de Tocqueville called "habits of the heart" in Democracy in America. Often, they encompass a general willingness to participate, a basic trust in democratic institutions, a shared commitment to the peaceful transfer of power, and a diffused sense of community responsibility. Some have proposed other virtues, like Nancy Rosenblum in Good Neighbors, listing "Easy spontaneity" and “Speaking up” as essential traits that allow the mass public to treat others with equality and respect, and standing up for what is right (Rosenblum 67, 109).

Regardless of the precise character of these intangible moral values, the conclusion is all the same. While individual citizens may not possess the detailed policy knowledge Lippmann deemed unattainable even for himself, these embodied moral virtues often can demonstrate a collective intuition regarding what constitutes fair governance, accountability, and responsiveness. Thus, the mass public can at least instinctively understand when actions are right or wrong and can make sound judgments in the general interest. This collective civic understanding, while difficult to measure, provides a crucial footing for democratic resilience – contributing to the public's general capacity to discern when a system is fundamentally failing or when leadership is overtly corrupt, even without a detailed understanding of the specific legislative mechanisms involved.

Moreover, voters have shown that they can almost autonomously adapt towards their own politically uninformed natures to arrive at reasoned political decisions. Often, voters employ a suite of tools known as heuristics, that enable them to make reasoned choices within the complex landscape of democratic politics. Doing so optimizes decision-making processes given the aforementioned constraints of time, energy and information. Rather than engaging in exhaustive research, for which they lack incentives, voters rely on information shortcuts or cues.

One of the most potent and extensively studied of these heuristics is party identification. Voters, akin to sailors relying on a lighthouse, can align themselves with political groups they feel they resonate with. This affiliation then acts as a powerful filter through which they evaluate a myriad of candidates and issues both efficiently and effectively. As Campbell et al. (120) articulates, party identification functions as a "standing decision", a pre-set course that allows voters to make choices across numerous elections and diverse policy matters without the arduous necessity of re-evaluating every single position empirically based on their own experiences.

While some attribute this use of heuristics with intellectual laziness, it dramatically alleviates the informational burden on the electorate, fostering consistent and predictable voting patterns. When a voter is confronted with the intricate details of a proposed tax reform bill, the nuances of which easily escape the common eye, a voter armed with the knowledge that their reliable steadfast political party staunchly supports it, or that a trusted labor union has unequivocally endorsed it, are thus given useful identifying cues on whether this bill suits or acts against their interests.

Moreover, voters can often make use of their own emotions to quickly arrive at judgement. The affective heuristic is one of these shortcuts, which Daniel Kahneman classifies as a “System 1” mode of thinking (Kahneman 21–22). Effectively, this heuristic shortcut is one that examines the immediate emotional process to a stimulus, thereafter making electoral or political decisions. By doing so, one effectively votes based on their vibes, defined as the general mood of a place or person (“VIBE | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary”), and by extension party or policy. These vibes act as a quick, holistic assessment of a politician’s performance, helping the uninformed voter come to a conclusion.

The rapid loss of support suffered by then incumbent Liz Truss can be attributed to this heuristic in action. Whilst of course, a majority of those who have lost confidence in her may not have had the economic understanding of her disastrous mini-budget, the hysteria generated from the depreciation of the pound, combined with the panic awash the bond market was sufficient for any voter to conclude that her time in parliament should end. Consequently, opinion polls showed that support for her premiership had dipped to 9% and she was forced to resign (Politico).

Another helpful heuristic is retrospective voting, a simple, direct method which shortens the long tedious process of individually assessing every political candidate into one simple inquiry – “are things better or worse than they were since the incumbent has been elected?” This question, though simple, instantly centers itself on tangible economic outcomes, acting as a powerful lens and allowing voters to understand if their leaders are accountable without needing an omnipotent understanding of the specific legislative mechanisms. This provides what Sniderman et al. (94) argues is an "impressively effective political map”, proving the “cement” of their mass belief systems.

"No Kings" rallies saw record turnouts of protestors opposing what they perceived as the Trump administration's increasingly authoritarian use of executive powers. Image credit: Axios, Nathan Howard/Getty Images

Further, voters frequently rely on the less tangible, (but equally impactful) heuristics of candidate character and perceived competence. By retrospectively evaluating a politician's leadership qualities — integrity, empathy, or overall competence for office based on their public demeanor, they can use these perceptions to offer a tangible basis for choice when detailed policy platforms are obscure or overwhelming. This provides a sort of intuitive shorthand for assessing a leader's fitness. A prominent example of this heuristic in action would be the fallout of the U.S. President’s debate between then incumbent Joe Biden and Donald Trump, where Biden’s widely criticised debate performance and incoherent ramblings provided an easy heuristic-based judgement for many of his own supporters that his mental fitness was severely impaired, and consequently unfit for the presidency.

Hence, when confronted with low information, the uninformed electorate is adept at making reasoned decisions despite hefty constraints. Of course, these heuristics are not perfect – however, their use is indeed expedient and simply effective enough for much of the functions in democratic societies (deliberation, reasoned voting etc.) to take place. More importantly, these mental shortcuts that simplify the process of making decisions are remarkably quick, making the electorate much more responsive as a check and balance to the state.

Conclusion

An uninformed electorate only poses a credible threat to direct, unmediated democracies where the citizen is the sovereign and no institution assists in focusing its attention. However, this threat is far less pronounced in actuality – much of the world overwhelmingly adopts representative democratic systems. Thus, in these representative systems, the public (while uninformed) continues to thrive, armed with a suite of heuristical tools to better understand politics and the world around them. Hence, the democracies and people of today both have shown that they can sidestep such a threat through both institutional and behavioural adjustments that have led to relative success.

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