[DD x NTU CAS] Dhaka at the Crossroads

DD x NTU CAS
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*This article is jointly published in collaboration with Nanyang Technological University's Current Affairs Club (NTU CAS). Co-authored by Luo Xuhong and Lukas Loke from Discuss Diglett and Bibiane Teng, Leroy Toh, R Navashen and Pavan Sakthivel Vijayakumar from NTU CAS. Cover image by Stacey Ngiam.

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The fragmentation of Bangladesh’s government just two years ago remains fresh in the memory of anyone examining the new, complex dynamics that shape the 2026 Bangladeshi general elections – its first since the 2024 general elections. The 2024 general elections were marred by heavy accusations of opposition crackdown, voter intimidation and electoral fraud, alongside electoral violence that drew condemnation from the United Nations.

The main culprit of this aggressive attack on democracy was Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her party, the Awami League (AL). Throughout her four terms, the party’s stranglehold on various aspects of public and civil life only tightened further and further. Yet, much like the bursting of a shaken can, the people erupted – amidst a haze of flying bullets, shrapnel and tear gas. The newfound role of the electorate aside, there are several other key factors that will come into play in this election. Economic insecurities continue to plague the common man, while lost martyrs re-emerge into the spotlight.

Parties and Personalities

For now, let us introduce the major power players of the political scene today.

Bangladesh Elections 2026 Opinion Poll Results. Image credit: Stacey Ngiam — Image credit: Stacey Ngiam

Bangladesh Nationalist Party

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is one of the main political parties in Bangladesh, which has fielded past presidents, though often marred by controversy. Going into 2026, the BNP plays the role of the opposition, led by Tarique Rahman. The BNP derives its legitimacy and support base from Rahman’s parents, both former major political figures. Despite having just returned from 17 years in exile, Rahman has become a leading contender capable of bearing his parents’ legacies.

Tarique Rahman delivers a speech at a BNP rally. Despite the long period of exile, he has been received well by the public. Image credit: Al Jazeera

In recent years, the party has been described as increasingly left-leaning. BNP’s platform emphasises the need to uphold democratic processes, an improvement in social services and “to bring an end to political and social divisions in the country by uniting spirit of Bangladeshi nationalism”.

The BNP campaigns for an independent judiciary, in the wake of what some have regarded as a targeted opposition attack on Tarique Rahman and his mother, Khaleda Zia. The two were heavily sentenced on charges of money laundering and corruption, and the BNP continues to maintain their innocence and that the charges were politically motivated. This secular, nationalistic, anti-sectarian standpoint sets them apart from their religiously driven opposition, the Jamaat-e-Islami. Foreign policy-wise, BNP is more India-friendly, and seeks close relationships with China, USA, and other Southeast Asian countries.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI)

The Jamaat-e-Islami has been a historically Islamist party that opposed Bangladeshi independence, but has sought to modernise and moderate in the aftermath of the July revolution. The JI campaigns on a religious platform, yet maintains leverage in the current political climate through its staunch support of the 2018 and 2024 protests. They place a strong emphasis on maintaining democracy, and have recently rejected the “conservative” label despite a long history of promoting right-wing ideologies. Aside from their support of the student-led political groups, the party funds many social services at the grassroots level, building a strong support base in the community.

Tarique Rahman delivers a speech at a BNP rally. Despite the long period of exile, he has been received well by the public. Image credit: Al Jazeera, Munir Uz Zaman/AFP — Tarique Rahman delivers a speech at a BNP rally. Despite the long period of exile, he has been received well by the public. Image credit: Al Jazeera

National Citizens Party (NCP)

The NCP is the political wing of the student movement that formed during the July Revolution. They are generally considered a big tent party, but with disagreements over whether to follow a more secular or more Islamist path. This manifests in their recent internal split after allying with Jamaat-e-Islami. Broadly, they support the formation of a “second republic”, one that would follow the ideals of the July revolution and war of independence. It is likely to be neutral towards the other powers in South Asia, as party leader Nahid Islam said the party will focus only on Bangladesh's needs. (However the actual outcome is likely to also depend on which parties it forms government with).

Nahid Islam addresses his supporters at a rally, calling for the Awami League to face trial. Image source: BSS News

Jammat-e-Islami and NCP have allied, alongside with a whole host of parties (mostly Islamist) to form the Like-minded 11 parties, to the concern of more secular-minded students. It has become a sore point for some, driving a split within the NCP.

The coalition demanded a number of goals in a November 2025 rally.

Proposed coalition targets from NCP and Jel parties. Image credit: Stacey Ngiam — Image credit: Stacey Ngiam

Please note that this is a machine-provided translation and readers should refer to the original website link (in Bengali) as the authoritative source.

The Month that shook Dhaka: Street Fury to Structural Fracture

We’ve introduced the players, now let’s set the scene. The 2024 July Revolution hangs above the Bengal Tiger like a dark cloud and holds massive implications for this year’s elections.

Within a year, it surged across the country, braving violent and often deadly repression. This led to the resignation of Sheikh Hasina, triggering a constitutional crisis whose effects continue to linger today. Notably, the July Revolution is yet another notch in the belt for Gen Z. Amid the waves of youth-led protests in the Global South in recent years, the Bangladeshi youth were one of the first – and their great success serves to remind Bangladesh’s political forces of the undeniable influence of the youth in the upcoming election.

Before the revolution was a country-wide phenomenon, it primarily began over quotas in government jobs. A third of the jobs in the public sector were reserved for certain groups, including descendants of veterans in the 1971 Bangladeshi War of Independence. Protests had previously broken out in 2008, 2013 and 2018 over the same issue. As the crisis worsened, Hasina resigned, and Muhammad Yunus became the head of the interim government on 8th August, 2025.

As the protests spread, protesters called for reform on more issues, such as:

free speech/free press clampdowns (Digital Security Act 2018 and Cyber Security Act 2023),
using LEOs and political organisations (like the student wing of the Awami League) to carry out repression (such as detaining people on the grounds of counterterrorism), and
corruption and economic mismanagement.

The July Revolution is one of the most central events leading up to the current elections, being directly responsible for the overthrow of one of Bangladesh’s most central leaders – Sheikh Hasina. It represents an extremely direct demand from the people of Bangladesh to their leaders, demands that have been ignored for far too long.

The main parties, especially the BNP, have taken notice, and run their platforms on anti-corruption and pro-government transparency platforms. The parties must also notice that the largely Gen Z-driven protests once again highlight the considerable influence of younger voters, with under-35s constituting just about a quarter of Bangladesh’s voting bloc.

After the resignation of Sheikh Hasina, Yunus took over as the head of the caretaker government, with elections to be held eventually after the necessary reforms. Yet, Bangladesh continues to face various issues that will inevitably affect the voters’ decisions. Under Yunus, there has been criticism over election delays. The ban on the Awami League has triggered protests by supporters, and has generated debate on whether the move should be regarded as a non-democratic bid to crush opposition or as part of an effort to remove corruption and pursue justice.

Younger voters have voiced disappointment with mismanagement under Yunus’ administration, including failures to stem violence against journalists and minorities. Bangladesh’s economic situation remains severe, and many of this generation are feeling the pinch. However, he has been successful in enacting several democratic reforms, and has gained confidence with youth leaders and other advisors on the panel of the interim government.

Aside from the new government, the July charter will also be up for a vote at the elections. It entails: strengthened checks and balances between the executive, judicial and legislative branches, a two-term limit for prime ministers and expanded presidential powers, enshrining the recognition of Bangladesh as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nation. A majority vote in favour would mean the formation of a constitutional reform council, tasked with implementing the charter.

Dhaka’s Delhi Dilemma

The demise of Sheikh Hasina’s AL has ushered in a new era of Dhaka’s ties with her neighbours in the immediate region.

New Delhi’s support for the AL has allowed it to stay in power for the past 15 years. In fact, Hasina’s ties with New Delhi were so close that after her downfall, anti-India sentiment was seen as essentially equivalent to anti-Hasina sentiment. As the election looms ahead, Bangladeshi political parties have routinely riled up anti-Indian sentiment as an easy method of mobilising support.

In particular, India’s refusal to extradite Hasina to Dhaka, where she faces the death penalty for crimes against humanity, remains a sore point in bilateral relations. Yunus has also accused New Delhi of permitting AL members to engage in political activity remotely on Indian soil.

Aside from Hasina, a youth leader, Sharif Osman Hadi, has also had a major influence on the younger voters. Hadi was the spokesman for the Inquilab Mancha (Platform for Revolution), and frequently spoke against Hasina and India. He was assassinated by masked gunmen and subsequently passed away. His death sparked violent riots, with protesters lynching bystanders and offices – anyone and anything they deemed ‘pro-India’. Following his death, resentment against Hasina, India, and especially Hindu minorities has only grown.

Hadi (centre) amongst fellow protesters at a demonstration in Dhaka, 2025. Image credit: CNA, Reuters/Mehedi Hasan — Hadi (centre) amongst fellow protesters at a demonstration in Dhaka, 2025. Image credit: CNA

At the elections, there will be arguably 2 impacts: The first is that Hindu minorities will likely be seeking parties that will bring about improved rights for minorities, such as a guarantee that minorities will have 10% of seats in the lower house of the Bangladeshi parliament. Conversely, hardline Islamist parties, emboldened by the inaction on communal violence, might amp up their rhetoric against these communities, further inflaming tensions and violence for the next government to deal with.

The reactions of Bangladeshis to both Hasina and Hadi are emblematic of the tumultuous political situation and anger-driven electorate, which will undoubtedly affect the voters’ priorities and party allegiances. Hadi’s death dealt a big blow to youth confidence in the new administration, who were hoping to vote for the aspiring independent candidate. Unfortunately, just as his life was cut short, Hasina continues to live past her death sentence in India.

Beyond internal politics, relations between Bangladesh and its supersized neighbour have grown even more icy in recent years. Historically, both nations, divided by religion, have always been at odds with one another, yet the election could be a decisive moment in thawing relations.

Multiple barrages and dams divert water flows along the 414km-long Teesta river as it winds through India and Bangladesh. Pictured here is the Teesta Barrage in Lalmonirhat District, Bangladesh. Image credit: The Diplomat

Simmering tensions over both economic and border issues have worsened in the period since. Ahead of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty’s expiry later this year, India’s stranglehold over the critical resource has also plunged relations to an all-time low. With negotiations effectively stalled, Dhaka has turned to Chinese offers of loans and technical assistance in revitalising the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration project instead.

Historically, the state of bilateral relations was closely dependent on the faction in power in Dhaka. As the Crisis Group report best sums it, the fact that Dhaka’s upcoming elections would yield a non-AL victor is the best opportunity for New Delhi to break free from this precedent for a complete reset in bilateral relations founded on the principles of reciprocity and mutual respect.

A Prisoner of Geography Breaks Free

India aside, Yunus has adopted an outward-looking foreign policy during his term, forging collaborations with Turkey, Beijing and even Pakistan. Unexpectedly, he broke with tradition and chose Beijing for his first state visit rather than New Delhi. The visit culminated in China’s offer of US$2.1bn in investments, of which US$400mn was earmarked to modernise Mongla Port, a sensitive infrastructure project that Hasina once awarded to Indian contractors but has since stalled.

Interim Bangladesh leader Muhammad Yunus meets Chinese President Xi Jinping in March 2025. Image credit: SCMP

In particular, deepening defence cooperation between Dhaka and Beijing has raised eyebrows in Indian security circles. China provided 73.6% of Bangladesh’s arms acquisitions between 2010 and 2020, while the latter reportedly is in the final stages of a deal to purchase 20 Chinese multi-role fighter jets.

China’s abovementioned offer to manage the water crisis has also emerged as a source of tension. Hasina’s insistence on talks with India to resolve water issues bilaterally rather than accept the Chinese offer reinforced the perception that the AL was effectively beholden to India; this eventually contributed to her downfall later on.

Most surprisingly, Yunus has also led a rapprochement with Dhaka’s archrival Pakistan. While Bangladesh’s historical baggage with Pakistan (with which it fought a bloody war of independence) has hindered attempts at bilateral engagement, ties have rapidly thawed since Hasina’s ouster. While largely a symbolic move, a Pakistan Navy ship recently docked in a Bangladesh port for the first time in 50 years. Both nations have also taken steps to establish closer economic and trade cooperation, such as a Pakistan-Bangladesh Business Council, after resuming direct government-to-government trade for the first time since 1971.

Amidst a freeze in bilateral relations, Bangladesh has cancelled 2 Indian government-to-government economic zone projects located at the strategic Chattogram and Mongla ports as of February 2026. Image credit: OpIndia

Yunus has cleverly engaged the world on Dhaka’s own terms, carefully balancing between the competing interests of Dhaka’s much larger neighbours. While this strategy has served Dhaka well in the interim, will it remain sustainable post-election?

Politics aside, let’s next examine how Dhaka’s economic engines have fared in recent times. After all, bread and butter issues are typically the primary concern of any electorate.

An Economic Reset

Subdued growth, shaky investor confidence, and systemic corruption. Bangladesh is a country thrown into chaos, an economy running on borrowed time. In this case, the 2026 elections are not just an exercise in democracy, they are a stress test on the economy. The processes and outcome of the vote, along with the policies that follow, will determine whether the Bengal tiger will roar again or whimper back into stagnation. For consumers and investors alike, the vote will be a proxy for economic confidence in the nation.

The state’s recent economic performance is a far cry from the impressive post-COVID recovery of the early 2020s. GDP growth is projected to fall to 3.8% in 2025, a 3.2% drop from the highs of 2022, driven by uprising-related disruptions and subdued private investment.

Bangladesh's Economic Pressures. Image credit: Stacey Ngiam — Image credit: Stacey Ngiam

Three economic pressures dominate the discussion. Inflation remains a daily struggle, with food inflation reaching levels close to 10% for much of 2025 and daily necessities like rice, edible oil and vegetables showing frequent price surges that disproportionately affect poverty-stricken households. It culminates in a catch-22: interest rates must remain high to combat the ever-growing inflation, yet the presence of high borrowing costs chokes investment and job creation.

Secondly, the banking sector remains weighed down by systemic corruption and ever-increasing non-performing loans, which form 10% of all loans, the highest in Asia. Lastly, NEET (not in education, employment or training) youth and youth unemployment rates have reached a peak of 30.9% and 16.8% respectively per a 2025 ILO estimate. And as we all know, youth unrest is the most politically combustible fault line.

Functioning as an economic signal, the credibility of the election enters the limelight. The flow of investment will depend on the quality of elections, whereby a good election is tantamount to a lifeline to an ailing economy. A study by Mike Touchton from 1990 to 2013 analysed 157 countries and found that foreign direct investment rises significantly following free and fair elections, as investors interpret credibility as a sign of stability.

After all, a government that respects democracy and the law will not seize property or tax exorbitantly, as was done by autocratic yet democratically elected leaders such as Robert Mugabe and Nicolas Maduro. That being said, elections cannot single-handedly rescue the economy.

Policy creation matters. But who can handle the heat?

Among realistic contenders, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party appears the most capable on paper. Its economic rhetoric encompasses deregulation and private sector-led growth, while senior officials have pledged to remove barriers to business. BNP’s campaign is based on post-crisis reform, positioning it within the public as a change of regime type of transition if elected, inevitably easing the pains of policy changes on the populace, particularly as it prepares to graduate from LDC status, and along with it, a loss in preferential trade, tariffs and loan benefits.

However, the credibility of its claim to tackle the banking crisis is tenuous at best: it would have to confront politically connected defaulters, something no Dhaka government has successfully done and lived to tell the tale. Its civil service remains closely tied to the party and free from regulation, meaning that loyalists may be running the show, not technocrats with the know-how to reform the economy.

The world’s eyes will be on Dhaka next week as the 8th most populous nation heads to the ballot box. The BNP has risen from the ashes of the Hasina administration to become the dominant player, but its lukewarm stance on India might prove costly. Meanwhile, the NCP's alliance with a “legacy” political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, was the very opposite of a new, refreshed “second republic”. Alongside their failure to ride the political momentum of the July Revolution, these are possibly the largest missteps of the upcoming elections.

This election presents a beacon of hope to Bangladesh’s youth who have been fighting for a better future. Regardless of the victor, whoever governs Bangladesh next will certainly face an uphill task in navigating an era of unprecedented regional instability combined with domestic economic pressures.