Lying in Politics

Cover image by Nicole Lee

Image credit: Katherine Cobb

As Political Philosopher Hannah Arendt famously put, “Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues.” Indeed, societies all around the world have, and do accept that politicians lie, and in some cases, should lie. Yet, there is a distinct resignation in our view towards lying politicians, almost a tacit understanding that lies are unavoidable, and are a necessary part of politics. 

After all, lying and dishonesty are often seen as distinct features of human interaction. Friends lie to friends to be polite. Students lie to teachers about their assignments. Teenagers lie to their parents about their whereabouts and the company they keep. Parents lie to their children that they can tell when they lie. I often lie to my classmates that I find maths easy. 

If everyone can, and does lie, why should politicians not lie, and why should they be punished when they lie? Further, as figures like Machiavelli have claimed, lying is seen as an essential part of statecraft – to be used strategically to mislead the public for the greater good.

Nonetheless, I will argue in this essay why principally, lying by politicians is inconsistent with liberal democratic principles, and why the effects of lies in politics can cause significant harms towards an open society.  Further, I will flesh out why punishment on politicians for lying should exist, and why specifically criminal punishment is appropriate. Finally, I will conclude by discussing what such a punishment should look like. 

Why Lying in Politics Is Harmful 

Induitably, lying in politics harms. It is a practice that is not ideologically consistent with democracy. It subverts the core principle of egalitarianism, where politicians, regardless of their intentions of lying, subvert and trample on the free agency that actors in a democratic society have. 

As some deontologists rightfully point out, the very act of lying itself is at least a moral wrong. Among them, theologian St. Augustine unmistakably insisted that God forbids all lies, period. Philosopher Immanuel Kant also famously held that lying, defined as a false assertion, is absolutely wrong under all circumstances. In his view, the liar "throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human being." Yet, very few contemporary philosophers would agree with the absolutist position of lying, that lying under any circumstances all the time is morally wrong and should be avoided. After all, such a rigid stance fails to regard the potential benefits or necessities of certain lies.

However, it remains that their arguments are morally instructive in why a falsehood is (at least) a wrong. As Kant rightfully argues, lying infringes on the autonomy of other fair minded reasoning members of society, which “transgresses the rights of human beings, intend[ing] to use them merely as means”, with little respect on the person's right themselves.

Extending Kant’s argument, when a politician lies to his electorate, he effectively is transgressing on their rights as human beings to operate in a democracy. After all, politicians are beholden to the people, and the rights of people to be seen as autonomous agents is one that functions as the core of what we know as democratic agency, and thus, democracy. 

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To lie as a politician towards his or her voters would thus mean subjecting them to manipulation and subverting their agency as free minded individuals in a liberal society, effectively undermining the very process that provides their mandate to govern. 

However, some consequentialist thinkers detract from this line of reasoning, arguing that lies can be beneficial. Notably, two thinkers, Plato and later Macchiavelli find little sympathy with this moral absolutist position of lying. Both give immense leeway for politicians to lie and mislead, with the implication that these lies can be beneficial towards the population at large. As Nietzsche once said, the ideal activist is one who “lies rather than tells the truth because it requires more spirit and will.” Certainly, lies can yield great benefits to societies – hence, why should politicians not be allowed to lie? 

Indeed, in The Republic, Plato proposes the “noble lie” or “gennaion pseudos”, fictions and deceptions told to the common people with the aim of protecting social harmony. He is not alone. In Chapter 18 of Machievelli’s The Prince, he highlights that political deception is necessary and in many cases, should be exercised. Arguing that “a prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, when such fidelity would damage him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant.”

Yet, these justifications for lying prove to be weak – both illustrate at best, a morally troublesome belief that those with more knowledge have a moral reason to lie, and at worst, furthering the inegalitarian belief that people differ in their capacities and their abilities in ability to rule and carry out tasks in a society.

Why Lying in Politics Should be Punished 

Given that lies by politicians can inflict substantial hurt, it might seem natural that most societies should be inclined to punish them. Yet, significant opposition exists. Many opponents of such punishments often claim that less intrusive mechanisms like fact-checking are superior in combating political deception, and that relying on formal legislative mechanisms creates a "chilling effect" on free speech.

However, these arguments, while seemingly justifiable at first glance, are ultimately unconvincing. Instead, I argue that criminalising lying by politicians is necessary as an adequate redress for serious harms, whilst at the same time deterring politicians from engaging in acts of political deception, both of which are not expressed by punishments that are less severe in nature. 

First, less-intrusive informal mechanisms like fact-checkers or voters themselves have largely failed in being able to prevent the spread of political disinformation. Often, increasing partisanship has gradually rendered fact-checkers less and less relevant, with some individuals being conditioned to disregard fact-checkers when their ‘own side’ comes under criticism. Social media fact-checks have also been found to have a minimal impact on the likelihood to share misinformation.

Even when these fact-checkers do work, their exposure is often limited, and their benefits small; audience sizes for many of these checkers are restricted and unable to overcome the partisan biases present in many of their users. Indeed, as the founder of Politifact (a fact checking organisation) concluded, “Fact-checking is not stopping the lies. Fact-checking is not putting a serious dent in the lies.”

Concerningly, voters themselves have not proved themselves to be effective at discerning political lies themselves. A study concluded that when presented with video stimuli and asked to discern whether a politician was lying or not, respondents' judgments on the truthfulness of the information presented were correct only 52.4% of the time, a marginal increase from pure chance. Certainly, more needs to be done to combat this epidemic of political lies.

Further, whilst the “chilling effect” is a commonly cited reason against restrictions of political speech, it does not prove to be a compelling reason against restricting lying by politicians. As legal scholar Frederick Schauer points out, the legal principle is “founded [...] on nothing more than unpersuasive empirical guesswork.”.

Others, like Suneal Bedi found that the “chilling effect” had little to no impact on the content of speech, and only had marginal impacts on the style and tone of messages. Given these fundamental limitations of informal responses, a more potent, formal mechanism is required to adequately address the gravity of political deception.

Indeed, criminalising political lying is necessary as it creates a denunciatory effect that can help to communicate and send a signal to civil society that political lies are not acceptable. As Joel Feinberg argues in The Expressive Function of Punishment, "Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, [...]  a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties."

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By creating a specific criminal punishment or sanction against lying in politics, it has a messaging effect that denounces the practice and seeks to at least express the community’s strong disapproval of the act. It is this very effect that the law can assign blame and censure with moral force that makes it distinct from other methods of punishment. After all, a politician being labelled as a habitual liar on Politifact, or being called a hack on Facebook does not carry the moral weight that adequately express the disgust societies have at large towards lying.

Finally, the effect of specifically criminalising political lying has a clear deterrence effect that would prevent politicians from lying, which again is at a higher level than a mere tort or informal action. Where these lesser efforts attempt to put a “price” on wrongdoing, criminal law seeks to “sanction” certain types of behavior, prohibiting conduct that has no value towards society. This prevents politicians from wielding wealth or influence in dodging other lesser penalties like fines. 

That is of course, not to say that all acts lying by politicians should be punished with the full weight of the law. As Robert Weissberg illustrates, “Imagine incarcerating office seekers for outlandish predictions about Social Security. Their rock-solid defense is obvious: “Just wait and see!””. Certainly, it is neither practical nor reasonable to exact punishment on politicians regardless of the content of the lie. The legal maxim de minimis non curat lex (“The law does not concern with trifles”) reinforces this idea, that for such sanctions to be justified, there needs to be serious harm that is created clearly from the expression of the lie. Yet, it remains convincing that some form of criminal sanction is necessary when it can be proven beyond reasonable doubt that a political lie has a large and harmful effect. Perhaps then, the integrity and structure of democracy can be upheld against the caustic effects of political deception. 

References

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