top of page

Charity, Competition and Control

  • Writer: Discuss Diglett
    Discuss Diglett
  • Mar 23
  • 9 min read

Updated: Jun 26

This article is co-authored by Lynn Lai and Luo Xuhong.


One of the biggest victims of the Trump administration is the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID for short. More than 90% of USAID’s contracts promising foreign aid and $60 Billion in overall U.S. assistance around the world were slashed seemingly overnight


The Trump administration viewed USAID’s role in fostering the U.S.’s image as a benevolent global partner as an unnecessary expense, aligning its cuts with Trump’s transactional, mafia-style foreign policy, where aid and support are contingent on tangible returns or loyalty.


“You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business,” Trump told Rogan. “OK. They want us to protect and they want protection. They don’t pay us money for the protection, you know? The mob makes you pay money, right?"

The United States was by far the world’s largest provider of foreign assistance, and funds projects in over 120 countries to combat epidemics, educate children, provide clean water, among other development efforts. Trump has pulled the rug from vulnerable communities USAID was a lifeline to, and forfeited a key instrument of global engagement. The landscape of humanitarian assistance and influence will see great change. Is the world ready to collectively shoulder the burden of humanitarian aid?


What USAID Actually Does


Trump’s White House recently published a list of USAID’s projects deemed “ridiculous” and “malicious”, with many initiatives focused on Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) making this list. However, USAID’s work is not merely spending on “woke” efforts as Trump makes them out to be.


USAID’s support is crucial for many global health programmes, especially the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). For South Africa, which has 8 million people living with HIV and 150,000 new infections each year, the abrupt termination of aid could be devastating. South Africa already shoulders 83% of its HIV/AIDS funding, with USAID’s support originally set to phase out over five years. America’s funding on global health extends beyond HIV. Nigeria and Congo together account for over a third of the world’s Malaria infections. Nigeria relies on America for 21% of its national health budget, and this funding is actively preventing up to 18 million more cases of Malaria every year. 


Instead of a gradual transition, response programs to diseases such as HIV, AIDS and Malaria are being abruptly cut off, giving local organizations too little time to seek alternative sources of funding. Critical care has ceased in many vulnerable communities, foreshadowing greater devastation.

Image credit: Pew Research Centre
Image credit: Pew Research Centre

Historically, the US has also spearheaded peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict states under the umbrella of the United Nations. Given that the UN budget is made up entirely of contributions from member states (whether voluntary or assessed), it is entirely reliant on these funding infusions to sustain its various operations worldwide. As the UN's single largest donor, the US gives large sums in voluntary contributions to specific UN agencies such as UNRWA and UNHCR that align with its own foreign policy priorities (in addition to its annual assessed budget contribution). In return, the US holds significant sway over what the UN does (and does not) do. After all, money talks. 

Donald Trump’s executive order that halted all US contributions to the World Health Organisation has forced the UN agency to downsize operations. Image credit: Council on Foreign Relations
Donald Trump’s executive order that halted all US contributions to the World Health Organisation has forced the UN agency to downsize operations. Image credit: Council on Foreign Relations

One of the best-known examples is Cambodia, where the US funded a brief UN experiment on administering an independent state more than 3 decades ago. For just over a year, the UN organised and supervised the 1993 elections that were supposed to plant the seeds of a vibrant democracy. With a price tag of over US$1.6bn, the ambitious mission turned out to be a white elephant - the UN caved in to Hun Sen's demands for a power-sharing deal after the prime minister (who was already in power before the elections) came in 2nd. Evidently, lofty ideals of democratic masterplans were but a mirage - after the UN’s departure in September that year, it was not long before the fragile power-sharing arrangement collapsed and Hun Sen returned to power in a 1997 coup. As Western donors cut back aid disbursements in condemnation of Hun Sen’s power grab, Cambodia simply pivoted towards China instead, receiving over US$9bn in Chinese financing between 2000 and 2016. In a similar fashion, other disappointments (see Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo) in the 1990s have reshaped the UN approach in a move away from attempts to impart democratic ideals towards the emphasis on facilitating multilateral dialogue and post-conflict reconciliation. 


In the same vein, USAID-supported programmes have also served as a crucial bulwark against the Kremlin’s shadow war of disinformation and subversion across Eastern Europe. Funding a variety of pro-democracy groups and capacity building initiatives are some of the more subtle ways Washington attempts to counter Russian influence in a region Putin sees as his backyard.


Naturally, Trump’s abrupt suspension of USAID funding is seen as playing right into Putin’s hands. Putin’s irredentist claims on Ukraine have fuelled growing fears that he may be eyeing neighbouring Moldova and Georgia next - both of which have breakaway territories that host Russian troops ostensibly for peacekeeping purposes. Programs such as Comunitatea Mea that fund community development projects and impart advice to local authorities in Moldova regarding transparency and accountability face an uncertain future. Already, Georgia’s autocratic leadership has seized the chance to pass a fresh package of legislation designed to muzzle critics of the ruling Georgian Dream party, even as the nation is rocked by months-long protests in the aftermath of a disputed election


In addition to life-saving medical aid, USAID supports many programs that help spread “American” ideals of human rights and democracy by supporting local civil society organizations that help ensure human rights and promote good governance. In Serbia, USAID supported “Ide Glas” (Here Comes the Vote) initiative, which empowered youths engaging in door-to-door campaigning to increase overall voter turnout, with the ultimate goal of building a more prosperous and democratic Serbia committed to European integration and self-reliance. In Indonesia, USAID trained 1,200 journalists in subjects such as data journalism and citizen journalism, enabling them to gather hyper-local information to hold those in power accountable and combat mis- and disinformation.


Apart from funding human rights NGOs and independent media platforms, billions in USAID funding (as its name suggests) have also bolstered the energy sector in multiple Western Balkan states through promoting private sector investments and dispensing technical assistance to government agencies. As government regimes’ performance legitimacy is intricately linked to the state of the economy, energy security has emerged as a key point of contention between the two competing spheres of influence (Russia supplies nearly all of Serbia’s gas needs and state-owned Gazprom has until recently wielded a majority stake in Serbia’s largest petroleum firm). A cut in USAID funding would thus be the opportunity of the century for Russian investments in the region to regain a foothold. 


What about the EU?


With USAID’s administrator ousted and it set to be absorbed by the State Department, the situation in America bears a striking resemblance to the United Kingdom’s 2020 decision to dissolve its Department for International Development (DFID). Merged into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) under the guise of efficiency, DFID’s ability to carry out its mission of international development diminished. 


While the merger’s alleged goal was to align both development and diplomacy, the reality has been far more complex. The FCO now being responsible for development aid, has been renamed to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). As naive as it may be to expect nations to carry out foreign aid with altruistic intent, this merger harks at a disheartening implication of Britain (and now America) prioritising national interests above other considerations. 


The consequences of the FCDO merger have been profound. This move not only diluted the UK’s commitment to poverty reduction, but also redirected aid toward projects serving broader geopolitical and commercial interests. Development experts raised concerns that this restructuring undermined transparency, sidelined humanitarian priorities, and reduced the UK's global influence as a leader in international aid. The rapid budget cuts from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI) further signaled that development was no longer a standalone priority but rather a tool leveraged for diplomatic bargaining and trade partnerships. If the UK’s experience serves as a precedent, USAID’s absorption into the State Department may herald a similar erosion of its autonomy and effectiveness.


China’s approach to aid  


As the US doubles down on an America-first foreign policy stance under the second Trump administration, China’s approach to foreign aid has entered the spotlight. Traditionally, China prefers to offer infrastructure funding as part of its Belt and Road Initiative abroad rather than directly disbursing humanitarian aid relief. Unlike the US and many other donor nations/organisations, China is careful to emphasise that it respects the sovereignty of recipient nations by doing away with preconditions such as extensive market reforms or responsible (democratic) governance before aid is disbursed, in line with its long-standing principle of noninterference in other nations’ internal affairs. In other words, Chinese financing allows recipients to focus on economic development without meeting these burdensome requirements that are usually imposed by the international community.  


In recent years however, China has established a foothold in the global humanitarian landscape, offering millions in aid relief to fund natural disaster recovery efforts in Pakistan, Kenya and Nepal in an attempt to improve its soft power abroad. Interestingly, China prefers to establish bilateral relations by channeling aid directly to the recipient state rather than to UN agencies or major NGOs that specialise in disaster relief as per the norm through the international humanitarian system. The protection of its economic and security interests regionally is suggested to be a key driving factor behind China’s decision to step up aid contributions under the Xi administration. However, having few conditions attached does not mean China gives away aid altruistically - aid agreements are often negotiated to include certain diplomatic or economic concessions from recipient nations. For instance, Chinese contractors are typically prioritised for rebuilding projects. Even then, Chinese spending on aid (excluding BRI financing, which mostly comprises infrastructure loans) has consistently remained a mere fraction of US spending. Given China’s economic woes, it is highly unlikely that increasing foreign aid spending would be a priority for policymakers in the near future. 


On Private Philanthropy


The private sector, made up of charitable foundations and private companies, currently fund 20.6% of the world’s humanitarian assistance. It is unrealistic to imagine the private sector stepping up to fill USAID’s shoes anytime soon. 


Even if private philanthropists scrounge up the resources to maintain humanitarian aid programs USAID has dropped, relying on private donors cannot be our Plan A. Unlike government aid, which operates with diplomatic weight and long-term commitments, private funding is fragmented, unaccountable, and often driven by potential returns on investments rather than the needs of communities. 


Relying on private actors to replace USAID is not just unsustainable; it’s a surrender of public responsibility. If America allows philanthropy to become the primary driver of aid, they concede that development is a privilege bestowed by the wealthy rather than a collective obligation.


A Final Note


While America’s judiciary has been trying to undo damage done to USAID by declaring DOGE’s moves as unconstitutional, there is no denying that the status quo of humanitarian aid is no more. China, as discussed earlier, and the European Union’s Global Gateway project demonstrate a paradigm shift from traditional models of development aid to one of global partnerships. USAID’s withdrawal has significant ramifications on global politics. Other actors now have an opportunity to expand their soft power. More interestingly, America seems to be turning her back on her legacy of leading the charge in delivering humanitarian assistance and spurring development. 


In an increasingly protectionist world, one can only hope that shared values of international solidarity and cooperation will prevail. The collective responsibility of global aid now rests on the shoulders of multiple stakeholders, including emerging economies, private philanthropies, and regional coalitions. The challenge lies in coordinating these diverse actors to ensure that aid delivery remains efficient, equitable, and aligned with the needs of the most vulnerable populations. 


References

  1. Civil Georgia. (2025a, February 6). Watchdogs: Repressive legislative changes announced by GD Threaten Fundamental Rights. https://civil.ge/archives/660338

  2. Cohen, J. (2025, February 28). “A bloodbath”: HIV field is reeling after billions in U.S. ... ‘A bloodbath’: HIV field is reeling after billions in U.S. funding are axed. https://www.science.org/content/article/bloodbath-hiv-field-reeling-after-billions-u-s-funding-axed

  3. Colvin, J., Cooper, J. J., & Weissert, W. (2024, October 26). Trump leaves Michigan rallygoers waiting in the cold for hours to Tape joe rogan podcast. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/trump-joe-rogan-austin-immigration-texas-election-7ed6b971a86c69ed4344205ab2db668b

  4. Cooney, J. B. (2024, September 18). 10 ways USAID is building and defending democracy and human rights. Medium. https://medium.com/usaid-2030/10-ways-usaid-is-building-and-defending-democracy-and-human-rights-7b7d46dd0295

  5. Council on Foreign Relations. (2025, February 28). How much does the U.S. contribute to the UN?. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs#chapter-title-0-2

  6. Dawar, K. (2023). Global Britain and the National Interest: Development Aid under the FDCO. King’s Law Journal, 34(1), 105–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2023.2188881

  7. DeSilver, D. (2025, February 6). What the data says about U.S. foreign aid. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/02/06/what-the-data-says-about-us-foreign-aid/

  8. Development Initiatives. (2022a, July 12). Donors of humanitarian and wider crisis financing. https://devinit.github.io/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2022/donors-of-humanitarian-and-wider-crisis-financing/

  9. European Commission. (2023, March 1). Global Gateway. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en

  10. Gong, L. (2021). Humanitarian diplomacy as an instrument for China’s image-building. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 6(3), 238–252. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911211019257

  11. IREX. (2025b). Comunitatea Mea (my community). https://www.irex.org/project/comunitatea-mea-my-community

  12. Knickmeyer, E. (2025, March 11). Secretary of State Rubio says purge of USAID programs complete, with 83% of Agency’s programs gone. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/trump-musk-rubio-usaid-foreign-aid-bf442d62af67918a6fc5eee839074601

  13. Knickmeyer, E., Lee, M., & Sherman, M. (2025, February 27). Trump administration says it’s cutting 90% of USAID foreign aid contracts. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/trump-usaid-foreign-aid-cuts-6292f48f8d4025bed0bf5c3e9d623c16

  14. Kruesi, K. (2025, February 7). From fighting disease to protecting the amazon rainforest, USAID has big impact across the globe. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/usaid-hiv-humanitarian-assistance-disease-spending-20f9cb969ffb6773e57886e34bf69165

  15. Lowell, H., & Gedeon, J. (2025, March 18). Musk and Doge’s USAID shutdown likely violated US Constitution, judge rules. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/18/elon-musk-doge-usaid-shutdown-ruling

  16. Maclean, R., & Jammeh, S. (2025, March 9). Africa received billions in U.S. aid. here’s what it will lose. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/08/world/africa/africa-usaid-funds.html

  17. MADANI Indonesia. (2022b, November 8). Madani Civil Society Support initiative. https://www.madani-indonesia.org/usaid-projects-support-citizen-journalists-to-protect-civic-space-and-promote-under-reported-development-issues/

  18. Ro, C. (2025, February 9). As USAID is crushed, there are prospects-but major limits-for private-sector action. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinero/2025/02/09/as-usaid-is-crushed-there-are-prospects-but-major-limits-for-private-sector-action/

  19. Schneider, A. (2023, December 11). Kosovo: Modernizing the energy sector. https://dt-global.com/projects/kess/

  20. Sun, Y. (2025, March 11). Can China fill the void in foreign aid? https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-china-fill-the-void-in-foreign-aid/

  21. The United States Government. (2025, February 3). At USAID, Waste and Abuse Runs Deep. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/02/at-usaid-waste-and-abuse-runs-deep/

  22. Williamson, A. (2023, June 27). The Economic and Political Implications of China’s Foreign Aid in Cambodia. https://journals.openedition.org/moussons/10476?lang=en 



   


Comments


bottom of page